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ADMINISTRABILITY-BASED
TAX SIMPLIFICATION
Steve R. Johnson**
The Boyd School of Law is a vibrant place, and our trajectory continues to
move strongly in the right direction. One of the things that has been so impor-
tant to us is the excellent support we have received from so many in and around
Nevada. An example of that support brings us together tonight. The Wiegand
Foundation has endowed a professorship at the Law School to support the study
of tax law. I am fortunate to be the current holder of that professorship. This
address is the first formal event memorializing the Wiegand Foundation's sup-
port for scholarship and for Law School. My thanks and the School's thanks to
the Wiegand Foundation for its support and for what that support will enable.
Our topic is simplification of the federal tax law, particularly the federal
income tax. Simplification has been called the "Holy Grail" of tax policy.'
Like the Grail, simplification is both important and elusive. Quests for both are
easy to start but difficult to bring to successful conclusion. We will consider
the topic from five perspectives. First, the federal income tax is now our main
tax, and it probably will continue to be. So, our attention should be on fixing
the income tax to the greatest extent possible. Second, in fixing the income tax,
simplification should be a high priority. Third, effective simplification requires
putting heavy emphasis - far more than it receives today - on administrability.
Fourth, we'll consider precedents: examples of administrability-based income
tax provisions already in the Code. Finally, I'll offer three administrability-
based simplifying income tax reforms that could be effected immediately.
I. PERSISTENCE OF THE INCOME TAX AND NEED FOR REFORM
Federal taxation is an enterprise of awe-inspiring scale. Each year, the
federal government raises over $2 trillion in taxes. Over sixty percent of that
comes from the income tax, combining the individual and corporate income
tax.2
* On April 22, 2003, the author delivered an address at the William S. Boyd School of Law
to inaugurate the E.L. Wiegand Professorship. This article is based on that address.
** E.L. Wiegand Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. The author thanks Shawn Patten and Puneet Garg for research assistance. The
author invites comments and questions at steve.johnson@ccmail.nevada.edu.
1 Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1267.
2 For Fiscal Year 2002, the United States collected about $2,017,000,000 in total taxes.
About 51.5% of that was individual income tax, and 10.5% was corporate income tax. Inter-
nal Revenue Service, 2002 DATA BOOK 8, tbl. 1, col.3.
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In recent decades, many in politics and academia have proposed what is
often called fundamental tax reform, i.e., replacing all or much of the federal
income tax with some other type of tax.3 Often, the candidate substitute has
been a consumption-based tax, such as a national sales tax, a value-added tax,
or a flat tax that exempts savings.4 These proposals have come from both sides
of the political aisle.5 Various advantages have been claimed for the proposed
alternatives, including simplification.
It is always desirable to re-test basic premises; thus, such discussions and
proposals have their use. However, we should not become overly excited about
the proposed alternatives. The cold, hard truth of the matter is that these pro-
posals likely will not see enactment. Something like the current federal income
tax is and probably will continue to be the federal government's principal tax
far into the future.
This prediction will be emotionally deflating for some. Americans love
change (or at least the idea of change), and striking out for bold, new frontiers
is exhilarating. William Archer, a former chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee, was fond of saying that his objective was to "tear the income tax
out by its roots."6 Such a declaration is heady stuff. A guaranteed applause
line. Bracing, in the way Martin Luther's "Here I stand" was bracing.
But, in the toll of years, the income tax outlasted Chairman Archer, and it
probably will outlast others of like mind. Chairman Archer has been out of
Congress for years now, but the income tax is still here, roots and all. In Amer-
ican tax policy, hard realities end to survive rhetorical exuberance.
At this juncture, I am uncomfortably aware of conflicting pulls: the aspira-
tional versus the pragmatic. I am no fan of the too often bizarre, incomprehen-
sible, and perverse composite that our income tax has become. So,
ambitiously, I too want to see, and will work for, fundamental reform.7 But the
3 Among the early important works, see William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash
Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Alvin Warren, Would a Con-
sumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980). Some of the
leading examinations of fundamental tax reform are excerpted in PAUL L. CARON, KAREN C.
BURKE & GRAYSON M.P. MCCOUCH, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ANTHOLOGY pt. VIII (1997).
1 For a description of some of the candidates, see WILLIAM W. OLIVER, WHY WE SHOULD
ABOLISH THE INCOME TAX: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPAL PROPOSALS chs. 20-23 (1995); John
K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the
United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095,
2112-15 (2000).
5 On the Democratic side, proponents of fundamental tax reform have included Jerry
Brown, Dick Gephardt, Bill Bradley, and Sam Nunn. On the Republican side, proponents
have included Jack Kemp, Bob Dole, Steve Forbes, Paul O'Neill, Dick Armey, Billy Tauzin,
Richard Lugar, and Pete Domenici.
6 Quoted in Howard Gleckman, Tax Reform Is Coming, Sure. But What Kind?, Bus. WK.,
June 12, 1995, at 87. Many others, enamored by this "sound bite," have adopted it or a
similar locution. E.g., Frank James, GOP Hopefuls Try to Court Anti-Tax Conservatives,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1995, at I IC (Richard Lugar); Michael Prowse, Flat Tax Frenzy:
Republicans Are Querying the Fairness of Multiple Tax Rates and Seeking Reforms to
Encourage Savings and Investment, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1996, at 16 (Jack Kemp); David
Tell, Second Thoughts on the Flat Tax, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 10, 1997, at I 1 (Steve
Forbes).
I My ideal outcome is a combination of major taxes. It would (i) substitute a value-added
tax for the income tax as the main federal tax paid by most Americans, (ii) retain a stream-
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pragmatic considerations described below - the reasons why something like the
current income tax is likely to prove hardy - suggest that it would be unwise to
put all of one's intellectual, emotional, and political "eggs" in the one basket of
fundamental reform.8
While hoping and working for fundamental reform, we should not neglect
efforts to improve what we have now and are likely to continue to have well
into the future. Through such a dual-track strategy, we honor both the aspira-
tion that cries for grand change and the pragmatism that prudently counsels
feasible change. Here are five reasons why some version of the income tax
likely is here to stay.9
First, the income tax produces a lot of revenue each year (as noted previ-
ously), and it does so with substantial predictability and reliability. We do not
know with similar confidence how much some new, substitute regime would
produce.
Revenue projections for a new system could greatly undershoot or greatly
overshoot the mark. In the one case, the new system would produce too much
tax and too great a drain on the economy. In the other case, it would cause a
revenue shortfall that would either crimp federal programs or necessitate sub-
stantial deficit spending. These possibilities would be particularly great in the
early years of the new regime, before experience improved prediction. But we
already have such experience with the income tax. The revenue risks associ-
ated with trying to re-create that experience, as to any new system, should give
considerable pause.
Second, the federal income tax is highly progressive.' 0 Its progressivity
has been flattened somewhat by recent legislation, 1 but it remains considera-
ble. The proper degree of progressivity for our tax system has long been
debated, and it remains controversial today. 2 Nonetheless, most Americans
lined income tax for high-income taxpayers, (iii) have a revised wealth-transfer tax (see infra
note 56) payable only by the "super" rich, and (iv) keep employment taxes but reduce their
rate if fiscally practicable. For generally similar proposals, see Thomas F. Field, The
Emperor Has No Clothes, 102 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million
Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002).
8 See, e.g., Katie Gilchrist, JEC Economist Says Consumption Tax Good Idea, in Theory,
102 TAX NOTES 1274-75 (2003) (citing Diane Rogers, principal economist for the Joint
Economic Committee). For a more optimistic assessment of the prospects for fundamental
reform, see Edward J. McCaffery, Ten Facts About Fundamental Tax Reform, 102 TAX
NOTES 1463 (2003).
9 The income tax will not be stagnant, of course. Major income tax changes are made often,
indeed too often for the health of the system. See, e.g., Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the
Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013,
1050-51 (2003). Frenetic amendment will change important aspects of the income tax. My
prediction is only that the income tax as a whole is likely to persist in broadly recognizable
form.
1 See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKnA, TAXING OURSELVES 71-75 (2d ed. 2000) (citing
data from Congressional Budget Office and Treasury Department Office of Tax Analysis).
11 See, e.g., William G. Gale, The President's Tax Proposal: First Impressions, 99 TAX
NOTES, 265, 266-68 (2003); William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, The President's Tax Propo-
sal: Second Thoughts, 99 TAX NOTES, 605, 606-07 (2003).
12 Among the classics in the debate are WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953), and CHARLES 0. GALVIN & BoRIs I.
BITTKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969). More recent contri-
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believe that, to some substantial degree, the affluent should bear higher tax
rates than the less affluent.
1 3
Many of the widely discussed alternatives to the income tax are propor-
tional or regressive in nature.' 4 They could be made progressive through vari-
ous modifications, but such modifications would decrease revenue and con-
siderably complicate the systems.' 5 Absent satisfactory solution of the distri-
butional problems, there would be serious opposition to replacing the income
tax. 16
Third, every tax system produces economic winners and losers. People
know what the economic effects of the current income tax are, and all sectors
of business have adjusted to it. Indeed, tax assumptions are built into most
transactions and decisions in our economy.' 7 In contrast, no one would know
for sure what the economic effects of some alternative tax system would be. 8
This would have two consequences. First, some political opposition
would develop to an alternative that might emerge as a serious candidate for
enactment. The opposition surely would include companies and individuals
who perceive that they would do worse under the new system than the old. It
also might include those unsure of how they would fare -a "the devil you know
is preferable to the devil you don't know" theory. Second, there could be
adverse economic effects. Tax uncertainty inhibits business deal-making.
Major tax changes, and even major tax proposals, have caused economic chaos
in the past. For example, the chair of the Senate Finance Committee suggested
butions to the debate include Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All
Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998); Barbara H.
Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157 (1999); Deborah
A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top One Percent, 56 SMU
L. REV. 99 (2003); Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation,
"Globalization," and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731 (2000).
13 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX 11 (1999); SLEMROD & BAKIJA,
supra note 10, at 61-64; William Safire, The 25% Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at
A19.
14 See generally EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT (2003); Steven A. Bank, The
Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2238 (2003).
15 See, e.g., George K. Yin, Accommodating the "Low-Income" in a Cash-Flow or Con-
sumed Income Tax World, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 445 (1995); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979).
16 See, e.g., Field, supra note 7, at 1126-27.
17 As an example, "our modem financial world has come to rely heavily on the [federal
income] tax return" as verification to facilitate an array of transactions, such as loans, pro-
gram eligibility, alimony, and child support. William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to
an Alternative Tax System, 23 VA. TAX REV. 205, 210-11 (2003). "While this, in and of
itself, hardly justifies the retention of an income tax, it does indicate the degree to which we
undervalue this significant ancillary role of the tax." Id.
18 See, e.g., Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 319 (2003) (discussing adverse effects on health care, pensions, homeowner equity,
and state and local governments of replacing the income tax with a consumption tax). In
addition, as to effects on the not-for-profit sector, see Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax
Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687 (1999); Charles T.
Clotfelter & Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on Nonprofit
Organizations, in ECONOMIC EEc'rs OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 211 (Henry J. Aaron
& William G. Gale eds., 1996).
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that a proposal to sunset the income tax at the end of 2002 would "create pan-
demonium in the marketplace." 19
Fourth, the adverse effects of replacement could be mitigated by transi-
tional rules. However, there would have to be an extensive array of such rules,
and that would be problematic in itself. Extensive transitional rules would be
politically contentious, revenue imperiling, highly complex, and fraught with
the potential for unfairness. 2' The very difficulty of constructing the transi-
tional rules is a significant barrier to replacing the income tax.2'
My final reason is particularly relevant to the flat tax. Flat tax plans vary
in important details,2 2 but their core is easily stated: low and wide. That is, by
eliminating many deductions and exclusions, the flat tax would considerably
widen the tax base. It would then apply to that base a single tax rate (or a few
compressed rates) considerably lower than the current top income tax rate.23
Whatever enthusiasm one might at first feel for this approach is considera-
bly dimmed by the realization that the flat tax would not remain flat for very
long. The current income tax did not begin as a monstrosity;24 it became so
over time. Congress responded to pressures from the electorate at large, key
constituents, and large campaign contributors by enacting numerous relief
mechanisms, subsidies, and preferences. At other times, Congress reacted to
fears of revenue erosion by enacting numerous anti-abuse rules. These pres-
sures would not magically disappear in a Bright New Day after enactment of a
flat tax. As future Congresses yielded to them, the flat tax would soon become
hilly, then ruggedly mountainous.
Two items of history support this prediction. First, after massive labor,
the Reagan Administration and Congress brought forth the Tax Reform Act of
1986.25 The Act actually achieved considerable simplification, through reduc-
19 William Roth, quoted by Ryan J. Donmoyer, With Work Piling Up, Senate Debates Tax
Code Termination, 80 TAX NOTES 521 (1998) (discussing the Tax Code Termination Bill
passed by the House of Representatives but not by the Senate).
20 See, e.g., Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 964 F.2d 1556 (5th Cir. 1992),
rev'd en banc, 987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting fairness problems as to tax transitional
rules but denying judicial remedy therefor).
21 For further discussion of the transitional rule problem, see SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra
note 10, at 177-80; Avishai Shachar, From Income to Consumption Tax: Criteria for Rules
of Transition, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1581 (1984); Graetz, supra note 15.
22 For example, the plan advanced by Dick Armey, former House majority leader, would
have substantially curtailed the capitalization requirement by permitting taxpayers to
expense most investments in business assets, regardless of the useful lives of the assets. See
OLIVER, supra note 4, at 106.
23 For an influential description and justification of flat tax approaches, see ROBERT E.
HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995). For historical analysis, see Steven
A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 329 (1996). For an exploration of
problems with a flat tax, see Alan L. Feld, Living with the Flat Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 603
(1996); Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 731 (1996); David A.
Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599 (2000); Lawrence Zelenak, The
Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197
(1999).
24 Not everyone agreed. Objections to the complexity of the modern income tax are almost
as old as the tax itself. See, e.g., G.E. Holmes, Is It Not Time To Simplify the Income Tax?,
BULL. NAT'L TAX Ass'N 11 (1926).
25 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
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ing the number of brackets, paring deductions, and substantially eliminating the
distinction between capital gains and ordinary income.2 6 Alas, the simplifica-
tion did not long endure. With a few years, brackets increased, deductions and
credits multiplied, and the capital gain/ordinary income differential returned.
The nearly two decades since 1986 were a bleak era in tax legislation, 7 and the
Camelot of 1986 is but memory.
Second, the Alternative Minimum Tax ("AMT") resembles a flat tax,
imposing a lower rate (26% to 28%) on a taxable income base considerably
broadened through reduced preference items.2 8 Yet the AMT, never wholly
flat, is becoming less flat as time passes. Increasingly, deductions and credits
are being enacted which apply for AMT as well as regular tax purposes.29
There is much pressure now to modify the AMT further, to minimize the extent
to which the AMT hits middle income taxpayers. The contours of the ultimate
AMT "fix" are still unclear, but a possible route is allowing more AMT deduc-
tions and credits,3" making the AMT less flat. Similarly, it is unlikely that a
flat tax, could it be enacted initially, would remain simple forever, or even for
long.
In short, there is a lot of emotional and political "pop" in advocating fun-
damental tax restructuring, but its fruition probably is just not in the cards. The
current situation fortifies 'me in that conviction. During the Clinton years,
many Republicans were vocal supporters of fundamental reform. Now, the
Republican Party controls the White House and both houses of Congress, and it
succeeded in pushing into enactment two major tax measures and several
lesser ones.3 ' Yet, neither Republican congressional leadership nor the Presi-
dent have pushed fundamental reform proposals, and the legislation they
caused to be enacted tinkers with the income tax instead of replacing it.
32
If I am correct in the assessment that the income tax is probably here to
stay, then our attention should be less on fanciful notions of a new Promised
Land of taxation and more on the hard and less glamorous work of improving
the land in which we now dwell and will continue to dwell. It is to that task
that we now turn.
26 For a description of the Act and the process by which it became law, see Daniel Shaviro,
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated
by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23-30 (1990).
27 See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Further Thoughts on Interpreting Tax Statutes, 17 ABA SEC.
OF TAX'N NEWSL. 11, 12 (no. 4 1998).
28 See I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (West 2004).
29 A prominent recent example is the special thirty percent depreciation allowance for prop-
erty acquired after September 10, 2001 but before September 11, 2004. See I.R.C. § 168(k).
That allowance is available for AMT as well as regular income tax purposes. I.R.C.
§ 168(k)(2)(F).
30 See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Jeffrey Rohaly & Benjamin H. Harris,
The Individual AMT: Problems and Potential Solutions, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 555, 584 (2002).
31 See, e.g., Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Stat. 752 (2003); Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
147, 116 Stat. 21 (2002); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
32 But see Grover Norquist, Step-by-Step Tax Reform, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21
(prominent conservative tax strategist describes current Republican strategy as an incremen-
tal movement in the direction of fundamental tax reform).
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II. NECESSITY OF SIMPLIFICATION-
A. Reasons to Simplify
I've said that it is important to simplify the federal income tax system.
That's not exactly a bold or revolutionary statement. Not many people disa-
gree, at least for public consumption. One rarely hears a person declare "I'm
all for complexity. I love the fact that the Internal Revenue Code is mind-
numbingly complex!"
It would be naive, though, to overlook the reality that - in fact even if not
in profession - some do oppose meaningful simplification because they profit
from complexity. As examples: (i) clever taxpayers may think that highly "cre-
ative" reporting is harder for the IRS to discover and correct in a complex
environment;33 (ii) the current wave of corporate and high-income individual
tax shelters are earning many millions in fees for some tax lawyers, account-
ants, investment houses, and intermediaries. These shelters typically involve
combining sets of tax rules in ways that are novel - often bizarre - and (by
Congress) unanticipated. Many of the shelters - thus much of the fees - could
not exist absent complexity; (iii) legislators may quietly prefer complexity
while loudly decrying it. It is widely believed that it is easier to bury a measure
to help an important constituent in a complex set of rules than in a simple set of
rules.3 4 Moreover, raising PAC money may be easier when the Code is ram-
shackle and ever-changing than when discipline exists to keep it simple; (iv)
the public is easily seduced. Taxpayers loudly complain about complexity, but
they are usually quite ready to accept additional tax "goodies" even when their
concomitant is yet greater complexity.35
While these realities exist, there is overwhelming intellectual consensus
(real) and political consensus (partly real, partly lip-service) that our revenue
laws require considerable simplification. That being so, we need not argue in
ponderous detail the case for simplification. Still, noting a few points will be
useful to guide deliberation as to the directions for reform. For me, there are
four principal reasons why simplifying the Internal Revenue Code, particularly
the federal income tax, is important.
(1) Reduced compliance costs for taxpayers. The more complex the tax
system is, the greater the burdens taxpayers bear in complying with it. The
compliance burden has been variously estimated. Some of the figures given are
almost surely overstated, 36 but widely repeated figures take on lives of their
33 A prominent recent case-in-point is Enron's tax schemes. See, e.g., Norman A. Kanter,
Joint Committee Looks at How Enron Used Tax Laws To Present an Overly Optimistic
Financial Picture, 21 J. TAX INVESTMENTS 51 (2003); Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the
Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 35; Harold S. Peckron, Watchdogs that Failed to Bark: Stan-
dards of Tax Review After Enron, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 853 (2002).
34 This is one of the perceptions behind that staple of tax policy: the "tax expenditures"
concept. See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept
and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679, 697 (1976).
31 See, e.g. Field, supra note 7, at 1125 ("Real simplification has eluded us because we have
failed to address head-on the public's addiction to tax incentives...").
36 For instance, one commentator calculated that the total cost of tax compliance in 1985
was over $360 billion. JAMES L. PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS: THE BURDENS OF THE U.S. TAX
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own, irrespective of their accuracy. Still, there is "little doubt that the tax com-
pliance burden is large and wasteful, and that it angers many people from
across the political spectrum."3 7 Two respected economists have concluded:
"The total cost of collecting income taxes, including the value of those billions
of hours that taxpayers could have put to better use, probably comes to about
$100 billion per year." 38
(2) Greater transparency and fairness of the system. The more complex
the tax system is, the harder it is to fathom its outcomes. Moreover, different
taxpayers have different abilities to manipulate a complex system. There is
substantial - and well-founded - public suspicion that well-heeled and well-
represented taxpayers can use a complex system to their advantage, while other
taxpayers cannot. Such a suspicion can seriously erode voluntary compli-
ance, 3 9 which is the bedrock of our system.
An aspect of the potential for tax manipulation is of great moment cur-
rently. The federal government is now attempting to combat tax shelters mar-
keted to businesses and high-income individuals.4" The contest is of great
revenue importance,4 and its outcome remains in doubt.4 2 Income tax com-
plexity is a main cause and support of current shelters. A complex Code allows
shelter promoters to combine sections in ways never intended, anticipated, or
SYSTEM (1993), quoted in WILLIAM W. OLIVER, WHY WE SHOULD ABOLISH THE INCOME
TAX, 6 (1995). Few others think that figure accurate.
31 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 10, at 3.
38 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 10, at 3.
" The then-Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation remarked that "today's tax
complexity ... clearly decreases levels of voluntary compliance." Lindy L. Paull, quoted by
Patti Mohr, Specialists Discuss Simplification in Light of Bush's Tax Plan, 91 TAX NOTES
867-68 (2001).
The word "voluntary" has sometimes been distorted. The courts have made its meaning
clear.
To the extent that income taxes are said to be "voluntary," however, they are only voluntary in
that one files the returns and pays the taxes without the IRS first telling each individual the
amount due and then forcing payment of that amount. The payment of income taxes is not
optional, however, and the average citizen knows that the payment of income taxes is legally
required.
United States v. Schiff, 876 P.2d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
40 For a discussion of the current wave of tax shelters, see Terril A. Hyde & Glen Arlen
Kohl, The Shelter Problem Is Too Serious Not To Change the Law, 101 TAX NOTES 119
(2003) (citing numerous sources).
41 Improper tax shelter schemes have been estimated to cost the Treasury about $10 billion a
year. Stephanie Francis Ward, IRS Wants Sidley To Name Names: Second Firm Sued for
Info on Tax Shelter Clients, ABA JOURNAL EREPORT (Nov. 7, 2003), available at http://
www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/nov7sidley.html (last visited June 12, 2004) (on file with the
Nevada Law Journal).
42 Some believe "the government is losing the war on tax shelters." Sheryl Stratton, KPMG
Skewered at Senate Shelter Hearing, 102 TAX NOTES 942, 944 (2003) (citing Professor
Calvin Johnson). On the other hand, testimony recently given to Congress, if true, suggests
that tax shelter marketing is declining. Kenneth A. Gary & Sheryl Stratton, Top Regulators
Weigh in on Shelters, 102 TAX NOTES 947 (2003).
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even imagined by Congress. "Complexity becomes the promoter's
camouflage. 43
(3) More accurate tax outcomes. The current system too often is so com-
plex that taxpayers who want to file accurate returns sometimes cannot do so -
because they cannot determine with confidence what the law commands of
them.4 4 In addition, excessive complexity stymies IRS enforcement. When
taxpayers file inaccurate returns - either through honest error or through taking
aggressive positions - the IRS must be able to detect and correct those inaccu-
racies. It is no secret that, in important parts, the Internal Revenue Code is now
so complex that the IRS cannot enforce it with consistency and rigor.
4 5
(4) Improved public support for the tax system. Taxes will never be rip-
roaringly popular, of course. Still, it is important that there be broad public
support for the system. In the United States, unlike some other countries, tax-
payers make the first determination of their liabilities through the returns they
prepare and file. Moreover, with the low IRS audit coverage that currently
prevails, 46 that first determination usually is the last determination. That being
so, it is important that taxpayers have sufficient commitment to the system that
their returns bear reasonable relation to reality. A very complex system that
alienates taxpayers undercuts the base of support crucial to the enterprise of
American taxation.4 7
B. Types of Simplification
To say that the complexity of federal taxes has reached undesirable levels
is too broad. The phenomenon of complexity is itself complex. Tax complex-
ity takes a variety of at least partially distinguishable forms. Consider three of
them: 48
43 Mark Everson (IRS Commissioner), quoted by Gary & Stratton, supra note 42, at 947
(identifying Code complexity as one of four factors contributing to the proliferation of abu-
sive shelters).
4 See, e.g., MICHAEL C. DURST (reporter), REPORT OF THE SECOND INVITATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 49 (1988).
41 See, e.g., id. at 10 (some provisions of the Code "are so complex as to be virtually
unadministrable").
46 The "official" audit rate is now around one-half of one percent of all returns filed. IRS
2002 DATA BOOK 17, tbl.10, col.3. This is down from about 4.5 to 5% in the mid-1960s.
Sheldon S. Cohen, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 113, 117 (1997).
These statistics both understate and overstate true coverage, but the impression of low
enforcement surely is correct. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 1015-21.
Claims have been made recently that IRS enforcement is moving back upwards, but
these claims have been disputed. See Jonathan Weisman, IRS Tax Enforcement Still Sliding,
Washingtonpost.com (Apr. 12, 2004), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A4247-2004Aprll.html (last visited June 12, 2004).
47 See, e.g., Field, supra note 7, at 1125 ("the baroque complexity of our tax system -
especially the income tax - drives ordinary taxpayers to distraction, saps their confidence in
the rationality or fairness of the system, and lessens their willingness to bear the tax burdens
it imposes").
48 For further discussion, see WILLIAM D. POPKIN, FUNDAMENTALS of FEDERAL INCOME
TAX LAW 32-33 (4th ed. 2002). For a slightly different taxonomy of complexity, see Charles
E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REv.
25, 41-43 (1989).
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(1) Detail complexity. This exists when one can reach the right result, can
figure out the result the law requires, but there are so many rules to wade
through that it is exhausting to reach that right result.
(2) Outcome complexity. This exists when the law is not clear about the
result it commands, i.e., when different people reading the rules can reach dif-
ferent conclusions. At the least, this phenomenon breeds controversy and liti-
gation, expending scarce resources. At the worst, it leads to unpredictable and
irreconcilable administrative and judicial decisions.
(3) Forms complexity. This is the variety of which most people complain.
The complaint is that there is just too much paper that taxpayers have to gener-
ate, file, and retain.
As a result of these multiple aspects, simplification sometimes involves
trade-offs. A measure that reduces one aspect of complexity may increase
another aspect. We will explore such trade-offs in the proposals in Part V. For
now, let us note only that useful simplification may entail alleviation of one or
more of detail, outcome, or forms complexity.
III. SIMPLIFICATION AND ADMINISTRABILITY
When I teach the introductory Federal Income Tax course, I often begin
by asking the students to identify the goals that a tax system should serve,
criteria by which the success or failure of the system should be measured. Stu-
dents adduce some goals and criteria with alacrity, such as revenue raising,
fairness in burden distribution, economic efficiency and incentives, political
acceptability, and furthering social policy.
Eventually, usually late in the discussion, a student will identify another
goal: administrability - the ability of taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts to apply
the Code with reasonable accuracy and without unreasonable expense. The
after-thought quality of the entrance of administrability into the class reflects an
all-too-often after-thought treatment of administrability by Congress and the
Treasury.
To be sure, there are many tax statutes and regulations that were prompted
by administrability considerations. However, the principle is honored more in
the breach than in the observance. I believe that the principle merits greater
emphasis. In particular, substantial emphasis on administrability is important
to effective tax simplification.
In crafting legislation and regulations, a choice often must be made. The
measure will exist to advance a purpose or, more likely, purposes since each
rule reflects a stopping point as well as a direction - the stopping point reflect-
ing compromise between or among different values. 49 Difficult trade-offs are
routine in tax legislation. As the Treasury recently observed:
The goal of tax policy is to raise revenue in an equitable, efficient, and simple man-
ner. These goals often are in conflict. A tax system that is perceived as equitable
may be complicated, while a system that is simple may be unfair or inefficient. Sim-
plification and other policy goals may also be sacrificed when the tax system is used
41 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-44 (1983).
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to achieve additional economic and social policy goals, such as encouraging home
ownership or work.50
Although perfection is beyond our grasp,5 ' how do we reach the least
flawed outcome?
Often, the choice is between two ways to proceed: first, write a very com-
plex statute or regulation that, at least in theory, serves the purpose(s) with
great precision, or second, write a statute or regulation that, at least in theory,
achieves a bit less of the purpose(s) but is far clearer, less complex, and easier
to administer.52
I think the better choice almost always is the latter: the less theoretically
exact but more administrable alternative. Too often, though, Congress and/or
the Treasury have chosen the other path.53 A problem with that choice is that
almost no one outside the Washington Beltway thinks that intricate rules are
applied on the ground the way that Congress and/or the Treasury hope or
expect them to be. Taxpayers ignore rules they can't understand, and the IRS
lacks the ability to rein in such departures. The call of reality is to accept this
fact from the beginning, thus to raise the status of administrability relative to
theoretical precision.
In urging this reorientation, I am not attempting to either increase or
decrease the revenue stream flowing into federal coffers. My goal, simply, is a
tax system that works. Sometimes, practicability and administrability will
mean moving a rule actually or apparently in a pro-taxpayer direction. Other
times, they will mean moving it in an actually or apparently pro-revenue
direction.
Another way to put the matter is to say that Congress must either simplify
the tax laws or must significantly increase IRS budgets. Perhaps complex reve-
nue laws can be applied - but only if the IRS gets big budget increases to fund
taxpayer education and service on the one hand and much more vigorous
enforcement on the other hand.5 4 The President and Congress routinely
underfund the IRS, as they do many other administrative agencies. They can
alter this practice and pour billions more each year into the IRS to apply and
50 U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., RETURN-FREE TAX SYSTEMS: TAX SIMPLIFICATION Is A PREREQUI-
SITE 1 (Dec. 2003).
11 "Whoever hopes a faultless tax to see, hopes what ne'er was, is not, and ne'er shall be."
Alexander Pope, quoted by Jeffrey L. Yablon, As Certain as Death-Quotations About Taxes
(Expanded 2002 Edition), 96 TAX NoTEs 395, 397 (2002).
52 For simplicity, I have phrased the choice as binary. Of course, there often will be multi-
ple possibilities, or different points on a spectrum between the two conceptual poles.
-3 A provision in the massive 1998 IRS restructuring legislation reflects this realization.
That legislation includes a "sense of the Congress" provision that, during the tax legislative
process, frontline IRS technical experts henceforth should give the House and Senate tax-
writing committees their views as to the administrability of proposed changes to the Code.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 4021, 112
Stat. 685, 785 (1998). In addition, the Act requires annual and other tax law complexity
analyses. Id. § 4022, 112 Stat. at 785-87.
14 For a discussion of these activities and the need to better fund them, see Johnson, supra
note 9, at 1027-39. For an update on IRS funding prospects, see George Guttman, IRS
Budget Request for 2005 Previewed, 101 TAX NoTEs 997 (2003).
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enforce the Code as it stands, or they can continue current underfunding prac-
tice and simplify the Code.5 5
IV. PRECEDENTS
Administrability-based tax simplification opportunities fall into two broad
categories. First, some regimes now in the tax law are not worth saving in any
form. As to them, the game just is not worth the candle. The appropriate sim-
plification would be to abolish them outright.56 Second, there are other aspects
of the law that should not be wholly eliminated but which can be profitably
streamlined. In these areas, I advocate advancing simplification through more
mechanical approaches; that is, doing rough justice with reasonable certainty,
instead of pursuing decimal-point precision with little realistic expectation of
achieving it.
Some significant and successful features of the current Code reflect
administrability-based simplification. I list several of these precedents below.
I will not try to be comprehensive. Instead, my purpose is to illustrate that
administrability-based simplification has some pedigree in American taxation.
Consider three instances: Code Sections 63(c), 102(c), and 152(e).
A. Section 63(c)
The Code has long allowed taxpayers to take deductions against income.
Scores of deduction sections are now in the Code. Each deduction was enacted
for a particular purpose. Some help to define the taxpayer's income 57 or mea-
sure her ability to pay.58 Others reflect non-revenue purposes, such as eco-
nomic or social engineering. 59 Theoretical perfection would require that each
tax return specifically claim each deduction for which the taxpayer qualifies for
the year and in the amount for which he qualifies.
But, for reasons of simplicity, we do not require that of individual taxpay-
ers. Since 1944, a standard deduction (currently in I.R.C. § 63(c)) has been
available to individuals as an alternative to itemized deductions. For tax year
2003, the standard deduction (for unmarried taxpayers or married taxpayers
55 The alternative to those two possibilities is unacceptable: continued erosion of compli-
ance with our revenue laws. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 1031-39.
56 Here's an example. The United States currently levies three major wealth transfer taxes:
the estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes. I, and a number of others, would
abolish all three of these taxes as well as I.R.C. § 102, the provision that excludes gifts and
inheritances from the reach of the income tax. Thus, wealth transfers still would be taxed,
but in a fashion more consistent with our conceptualization of income and - crucially -
greatly simplifying the federal tax structure. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and
Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978);
Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1992); John K. McNulty, A Transfer Tax Alternative: Inclusion
Under the Income Tax, 4 TAX NoTEs 24 (1976).
17 E.g., I.R.C. § 162 (West 2004) (allowing deduction of ordinary and necessary business
expenses).
58 E.g., I.R.C. § 213 (allowing deduction of some medical expenses).
" 9 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(2)(A), 170 (allowing deduction of, respectively, some home
mortgage interest expenses and charitable contributions).
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filing separate returns) was $4750.60 A taxpayer tabulates her itemized deduc-
tions on Schedule A of the income tax return. If their total exceeds $4750, the
taxpayer will claim the itemized deductions. If their total is less than $4750,
the taxpayer will eschew itemization, claiming the $4750 standard deduction
instead.
Since the inception of the standard deduction and still today, the clear
majority of taxpayers have used the standard deduction. 6 1 But this entails sev-
eral aspects of imprecision. (1) Taxpayers who claim the standard deduction
because its amount exceeds their itemized deductions have received excessive
allowances, to the detriment of the fisc. (2) Some taxpayers whose itemized
deductions exceed the standard deduction amount still use the standard deduc-
tion. It is easier, and it obviates the need to obtain and preserve substantiating
documents. These taxpayers have been over-taxed, albeit by their own choice.
(3) Consider a taxpayer whose itemized deductions are below the standard
deduction threshold and who is considering spending money on something
qualifying for itemized deduction (making a charitable contribution, for exam-
ple). That taxpayer would realize that he would get little or no tax benefit for
the expenditure since the additional itemized deduction would simply replace
otherwise allowable standard deduction. This fact can blunt incentives Con-
gress was trying to create in enacting itemized deductions. In other words,
[t]he standard deduction reduces the value of itemized deductions. Regardless of
whether a taxpayer has no actual itemized deduction or actual itemized deductions
exactly equal to the standard deduction, his taxable income is the same. The standard
deduction can be viewed therefore as disallowing an equivalent amount of itemized
deductions or as giving a free ride to taxpayers who have not incurred any expenses
generating itemized deductions. Whether the itemized deductions are viewed as
helping to define the taxpayer's economic income .... as incentives to engage in
socially useful conduct .... or as tailoring tax liabilities to the taxpayer's ability to
pay . . . . the standard deduction interferes with the achievement of these
objectives. 62
These effects notwithstanding, Congress acted well in creating the stan-
dard deduction. That device is among the most important and successful
instances of administrability-based simplification in the income tax. It pro-
motes all three types of simplification identified earlier.6 3 It decreases detail
complexity since non-itemizing taxpayers can ignore scores of Code sections.
It reduces forms complexity since Schedule A and supporting schedules, forms,
and worksheets can be omitted. It eases outcome complexity since the amount
of the available deduction is known with certainty. Controversy rarely arises
when the standard deduction has been claimed. 64
60 The standard deduction is adjusted annually for cost-of-living changes. I.R.C. § 63(c)(4).
61 Originally, over eighty percent of taxpayers used the standard deduction. BoRIs I. Brrr-
KER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS T 21.4[l] - 21.4[2] (3d ed. 2002). Now, about two-thirds do. See Internal
Revenue Service, Tax Stats at a Glance (Oct. 17, 2003), available at http://www.irs. gov/
taxstats/article/O,,id=102886,00.html (last visited June 12, 2004).
62 BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 61, at T 21.4[2].
63 See supra text accompanying note 48.
4 The amount of the standard deduction depends on the taxpayer's filing status (see I.R.C.
§ 63(c)(2), (g) (West 2004)), which is occasionally controversial. Taxpayers occasionally
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The simplification gains produced by the standard deduction easily pre-
ponderate over the mechanism's ill effects. Indeed, Congress has underscored
the importance it attaches to the standard deduction. On several occasions, as
taxpayer use of the standard deduction flagged, Congress changed the statute to
increase the attractiveness, and so the use, of the standard deduction.65
B. Section 102(c)
Under the modern federal income tax, donees typically need not pay tax
on gifts they receive. 66 Whether a given transfer constitutes a gift for this pur-
pose depends on the state of mind of the transferor. "[I]f the payment proceeds
primarily from the constraining force of any moral or legal duty or from the
incentive of anticipated benefit of an economic nature, it is not a gift."' 67 The
transfer is an excludible gift only if it proceeds from "detached and disinter-
ested generosity" on the part of the transferor, "out of affection, respect, admi-
ration, charity or like impulses."68
The statute identifies several types of transfers that do not qualify for the
exclusion. As relevant here, I.R.C. § 102(c) provides that the exclusion does
not apply to "any amount transferred by or for an employer to, or for the benefit
of, an employee."'69 This rule is a categorical disqualification from the exclu-
sion, not a mere presumption. That is, employer-to-employee transfers never
can be excluded from taxability - even if it is conclusively established that the
employer made the transfer out of detached and disinterested generosity.
Thus, by the measuring stick of the "detached and disinterested generos-
ity" standard, Section 102(c) prevents perfect justice. Each year, there will be
some cases in which such generosity was the primary cause of an employer's
transfer to an employee. They will be rare (employers more often part with
money in order to reward past employee efforts or to motivate future employee
efforts), but they will occur.70 Employers like Mr. Fezziwig 7' are not the
norm, but they do exist. Section 102(c) bars the door of exclusion to employee-
donees of such employer-donors. Each time this happens is an imprecision in
light of the standard defining excludible gifts.
rue their standard versus itemized choice and try to change it, provoking controversy. See
I.R.C. § 63(e)(3). The standard deduction is increased for aged and blind taxpayers. See
I.R.C. § 63(0. This occasionally involves classification controversy. But these are about
the only conflicts, and disputes on such grounds are not particularly common.
65 See BITrKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 61, 21.4[2].
66 I.R.C. § 102(a); see generally Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and
Gefis" - the Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a
Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 441 (2003). Gifts were taxable under some prior versions of the federal income tax.
E.g., Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 553 (1894).
67 Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (internal quote marks and citations
omitted).
68 Id. (internal quote marks and citations omitted).
69 I.R.C. § 102(c)(1) (added to I.R.C. by Pub. L. No. 99-514 in 1986).
70 For a discussion of the problematic "mixed motive" cases, see BITrKER, MCMAHON &
ZELENAK, supra note 61, T 5.2[3] - 5.2[7].
7' The kindly first employer of the young Ebeneezer Scrooge in Dickens' A CHRISTMAS
CAROL.
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Nonetheless, Congress was right to enact Section 102(c). Without the pro-
vision, many employees would claim the exclusion as to payments from their
employers. The general standard is subjective,7 2 and eager, tax-minimizing
taxpayers often wear rose-colored glasses. Though some of the claimed exclu-
sions would be valid under the standard, the great majority would not be.
Given low IRS audit rates,73 many of the invalid claims would never be chal-
lenged by the IRS. Of the claims that the IRS did disallow, and that were
litigated, taxpayers would prevail in some cases but would lose in far more.
The costs - in money, time, and stress - of controversy resolution are
high, both to the parties and to the system. Given that, it is a reasonable, indeed
wise, decision to screen out this whole class of possible exclusion claims. The
costs of sifting through many meritless cases to discover a few meritorious
cases are not worth incurring. Section 102(c) exemplifies administrability-
based simplification, a rational choice for rough-justice simplicity over theoret-
ically more precise complication.
And, again, the rule more precise in theory may not be so in fact. Litiga-
tion outcomes are inherently uncertain, particularly when the litigation pro-
ceeds under a subjective standard.74 Cases sometimes turn on adventitious
matters. So, were Section 102(c) not in the law, not all contested cases would
be decided correctly under the "detached and disinterested generosity" stan-
dard. Some good claims would fail; some bad claims would succeed. This
inevitability further underscores the wisdom of the administrability-based Sec-
tion 102(c).
C. Section 152(e)
Taxpayers may take income tax deductions for personal exemptions for
dependents.75 Several tests must be satisfied for a taxpayer to claim another as
a dependent. One is that the taxpayer must have provided over half of the
support for the putative dependent during the tax year in question.7 6 Under
Section 152(e), a special rule applies for a child of divorced or legally sepa-
rated parents. In general, the parent having custody of the child for the greater
portion of the year "shall be treated" as having provided over half of the sup-
72 See, e.g., Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Tax Status of Gifts That May Be Com-
pensatory, 100 TAX NOTES 925, 927-28 (2003) (concluding that the Duberstein standard "is
highly subjective. For that reason, taxpayers have fairly wide latitude in classifying as gifts
amounts they receive.").
73 See supra text accompanying note 46.
74 For example, Stanton v. United States, a companion case to the seminal Commissioner v.
Duberstein case, involved a taxpayer who had been employed by a corporation for ten years.
When he retired, the company paid him $20,000. The company called the payments a "gift."
There was conflicting evidence as to whether the payment was made because the taxpayer
was well-liked personally or because of his work on the company's behalf. The IRS deter-
mined that the payments were not gifts; the district court held that they were; the Second
Circuit reversed, holding for the IRS; and the Supreme Court (with four justices dissenting)
vacated and remanded the case to the district court. Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278,
281-83, 292-93 (1960).
7- I.R.C. § 15 1(a), (c) (West 2004). Dependency status matters for several other purposes
as well. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21(a), (b)(l)(A) (credit for costs of care services rendered to
§ 151 dependent, if the services are necessary for gainful employment).
76 I.R.C. § 152(a).
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port for the child,7 7 and is thus the parent who can claim the child as a
dependent.
In some instances, this special rule will lead to theoretical imprecision.
The non-custodial (or lesser custodial) parent sometimes provides over half the
support for the child.78 As was true of Section 102(c) discussed above, Section
152(e) is an absolute rule, not a mere presumption. 79 The custodial parent will
be allowed the dependency exemption even if the non-custodial parent proves
that she (not the custodial parent) provided the bulk of the support.8 ° Since the
dependency exemption is intended to cushion the economic strains (not the
other strains) of child-rearing, the special rule yields imprecise results in such
cases, at least in theory.
Nonetheless, Section 152(e) makes a lot of sense for the two reasons
we've noted before. First, theoretical precision does not guarantee precision in
actual operation. When the parents are not cooperative (a situation not unheard
of in cases of divorce or separation) and when only one of the parents is before
the IRS or the court, it can be "exceedingly difficult, if not impossible" to
determine precisely how much each parent contributed to the support of the
child.81
Second, and more important, any loss of precision as a result of Section
152(e) is amply compensated for by the huge gain in administrability the provi-
sion accomplishes. The long time chair of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee explained the need for Section 152(e) thusly:
The number of disputes involving this issue is so great that it has cast a serious
administrative burden on the Service and has tended to clog the administrative
machinery involved in bringing them to a conclusion. In fact, a disproportionate
number of these cases are taken to the Tax Court for resolution. It has been esti-
mated by the Service that during a recent year 5 percent of all income tax cases
handled at the informal conference level of the administrative process involved this
issue as the principal issue. The amounts involved in these cases, although signifi-
cant to the taxpayers, are quite small. The costs to the taxpayers and the Government
of resolving this issue in the administrative process and in the Tax Court are inordi-
nate when compared with the amounts involved. 82
With the growing number of divorces since adoption of Section 152(e) in
1967, the need for the provision is even greater now. Section 152(e) is a clear
example of condign administrability-based tax simplification.
" I.R.C. § 152(e)(1) (added to the Code by Pub. L. No. 90-78 in 1967).
78 "Support" for this purpose is measured exclusively monetarily. Love, care, labor, and
services do not figure into the support calculation. E.g., Bartsch v. Comm'r, 41 T.C. 883
(1964) (en banc).
79 There are some statutory and case law exceptions to the rule of I.R.C. § 152(e)(1). E.g.,
I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (written agreement shifting the exemption to non-custodial spouse); Pro-
phit v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 507 (1972) (en banc), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1973) (United
States non-custodial parent allowed the exemption when the custodial parent is not a United
States citizen or resident and does not file United States income tax returns). Absent some
special circumstance, however, Section 152(e)(1) is absolute.
8' E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(f) ex.(l) (2002).
81 Labay v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 6, 9 (1970), aff'd, 450 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1971).
82 H. REP. No. 102, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); S. REP. No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-
3 (1967); 113 Cong. Rec. 6611 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Wilbur Mills).
[Vol. 4:573
THE E.L. WIEGAND LECTURE
V. PROPOSALS
As far as candidates for simplification go, the Internal Revenue Code is a
target-rich environment. Scores, indeed hundreds, of portions of the Code are
ripe for administrability-based simplification. Some such changes already have
been proposed. For instance, I think highly of many of the possibilities identi-
fied by the Joint Committee83 and by the National Taxpayer Advocate.8 4
However meritorious, these suggestions do not exhaust the field of pos-
sibilities. On a prior occasion, I described a number of simplification possibili-
ties as to procedural mechanisms established or enhanced by the 1998 IRS
restructuring legislation.8 5 Now, I offer three other proposals, all in the area of
income taxation of business entities and their owners.8 6 The proposals are: (1)
decrease pass-through regimes from two to one, (2) abolish the TEFRA part-
nership audit rules, (3) and eliminate the accumulated earnings tax.
A. Decrease the Number of Pass-Through Regimes
1. Complexity
Currently, there are three principal income tax regimes for business enti-
ties. 7 C corporations are viewed as separate from their shareholders and so are
independent taxable entities.88 In contrast, some entities are treated as pass-
through vehicles. For the most part, these entities do not themselves pay fed-
eral income tax. The tax results of their operations flow through to their own-
ers and are reported on the owners' income tax returns. The two main pass-
through regimes are partnerships under Subchapter K89 and S corporations
under Subchapter S.9°
83 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL
TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION
8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (2001).
84 See National Taxpayer Advocate, FY 2002 Annual Report to Congress 156-247; National
Taxpayer Advocate, FY 2001 Annual Report to Congress 72-227. Not all of the changes
suggested in these reports are simplifications. Many are.
85 See Johnson, supra note 9, at 1054-62.
86 For proposals reconceptualizing taxation of business income and enterprises, see
Armando Gomez, Rationalizing the Taxation of Business Entities, 49 TAX LAW. 285 (1996);
Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX LAW. 229
(1998).
87 Additional regimes exist for various specialized entities, including banks, I.R.C. §§ 581-
97 (West 2004); electing large partnerships, I.R.C. §§ 771-77; life insurance companies,
I.R.C. §3 801-18; other insurance companies, I.R.C. §§ 831-35; regulated investment com-
panies, I.R.C. §§ 851-855; real estate investment trusts, I.R.C. §§ 856-59; real estate mort-
gage investment conduits, I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G; financial asset securitization investment
trusts, I.R.C. §§ 860H-860L; and cooperatives, I.R.C. §§ 1381-88.
88 I.R.C. § 11 (a); see also I.R.C. §§ 301-85.
89 I.R.C. §§ 701-77.
90 I.R.C. §§ 1361-78.
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The rules for the two pass-through regimes are similar in some ways 9' but
differ in other ways.9" Although there are peculiarities under Subchapter S, on
the whole Subchapter K involves greater complexity. 93 There is irony here
since simplicity was a purported goal of Subchapter K. In enacting the partner-
ship tax rules, Congress sought "simplicity, flexibility, and equity as between
partners."'94 Yet - as often is the case - flexibility, equity, and other goals
(such as abuse prevention) eclipsed the simplicity goal.
The Subchapter K rules are tolerable for simple partnerships, such as those
that have no special allocations, that have assets of only a few, relatively
homogenous kinds, and that eschew various elections available to them under
Subchapter K.95 However, as a partnership's contributions, distributions, allo-
cations, or other operations become more varied, Subchapter K becomes mind-
numbingly complex in important respects. Consider a few illustrations of this
complexity:
(i) Rules governing the allocation among the partners of the partnership's
items of income, deductions, credits, and basis: A striking instance is the
Interhotel case, where the IRS maintained that the partnership's allocations
were invalid under the governing regulations.96 In the first opinion in the case,
the Tax Court accepted the IRS's position.97 On appeal, however, the Govern-
ment conceded that "it erred in convincing the Tax Court to refrain from
including a minimum gain chargeback in the court's calculations for purposes
of the comparative liquidation test" set out in the regulations.9" Accordingly,
the circuit court vacated and remanded. When the IRS and the Tax Court stroll
together down the path of later admitted error, one may suspect that there is
91 For instance, in both regimes, basis is the mechanism used to track investment in the
entity and ultimately to insure that the business' profits are taxed only once. Many items
produce similar basis adjustments under both Subchapter K and Subchapter S. Compare
I.R.C. §§ 705 & 752 to I.R.C. § 1367.
92 For example, entity-level borrowing increases partners' bases but does not increase S
shareholders' bases, a significant trap for the unwary. See, e.g., I BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES
S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 6-32 to 6-
33 (7th ed. 2002).
9' For a comparison of principal aspects of partnership and S corporation taxation, see John
W. Lee, Choice of Small Business Tax Entity: Facts and Fictions, 87 TAX NOTES 417, 431-
32 (2000); Richard W. Mertens, Choosing Between a Limited Liability Company and an S
Corporation, N.Y.S. BAR J., May/June 1996, at 52; Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It Time To
Give the S Corporation a Proper Burial?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 591, 596-611 (1996).
94 H. REP. No. 83-1337, at 66 (1954); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 101 (1954).
95 Another example is the election under I.R.C. § 754 (2002), which leads to complex basis
readjustments under such sections as 734(b) and 755 (2002). For a discussion of such elec-
tions and their consequences, see LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE
LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS ch. 12
(2d ed. 2000).
96 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2002).
9' Interhotel Co. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 819 (1997).
98 Interhotel Co. v. Comm'r, 221 F.3d 1348, 2000 WL 674745, *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam; unpublished disposition). On remand, the Tax Court again held for the IRS but this
time on a better rationale. Interhotel Co. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1804 (2001).
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some outcome complexity about the rule at issue. Yet this is not the first time
such a walk has been taken in partnership tax litigation.99
(ii) Rules characterizing transactions between partners and their partner-
ship: When a partner sells property to a partnership in which she is a partner,
loans money to it, or conducts other business with it, how should those dealings
be categorized? Depending on several factors, the Code gives any of three
answers: an entity approach, an aggregate approach, and a hybrid approach. 0 0
The result is that this is "[o]ne of the more difficult issues under Subchapter K
. . . .both conceptual[ly] and practical[ly]."' 0 ' For instance, Congress has
changed its mind about such characterizations over time.10 2 In 1981, the IRS
reversed its view of a 1975 Tax Court victory it had won in the area. 13
(iii) Rules governing liquidating payments to a retired partner or the estate
of a deceased partner. The applicable statute, I.R.C. § 736, is a poster-child for
awkward drafting. This arises from the fact that the statute was revised at vari-
ous times by Congresses whose goals and preferences differed as to how to
treat such payments. The exasperation of dealing with the section was captured
in this "cry from the judicial heart" by the Tax Court:
The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions of Subchapter K
present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without the
expenditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort even by one who is
sophisticated in tax matters with many years of experience in the tax field. . . . If
there should be any lingering doubt on this matter one has only to reread section 736
in its entirety ... and give an honest answer to the question whether it is reasonably
comprehensible to the average lawyer or even to the average tax expert who has not
given special attention and extended study to the tax problems of partners. Surely, a
statute has not achieved "simplicity" when its complex provisions may confidently
be dealt with by at most only a comparatively small number of specialists who have
been initiated into its mysteries.
10 4
Of the varieties of complexity identified previously,10 5 detail complex-
ity 10 6 and forms complexity 10 7 appear in Subchapter K, but they are dwarfed
by outcome complexity. In part, this results from ambiguities particular to
99 See Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236
(1990) (Government, at appeal, conceded error as to the Tax Court decision for the IRS that
receipt of a partnership profits interest in return for services rendered to the partnership gave
rise to immediate inclusion into income for the service-rendering partner).
1o I.R.C. §707(a), (c) (West 2004); see, e.g., GLENN E. COVEN, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICH-
ARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ch. 20 (2d ed. 2002).
101 COVEN, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 100, at 968.
102 See id. at 968-69 & n.l.
103 Rev. Rul. 81-300, 1981-2 C.B. 143, 144 (commenting on Pratt v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 203
(1975), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977)).
1o Foxman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964), aft'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
105 See supra text accompanying note 48.
106 The impenetrable substantial economic effect regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (2002),
are the clearest example, though other partnership tax regulations also stake impressive
claims to being unreadable.
107 Schedules K and K-I of Form 1065, the partnership return, require more work than
really needed to promote important tax administration objectives. They could and should be
streamlined. See CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 95, at 26-27.
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given sections, such as Section 736 just discussed.' In other part, it results
from Congress' failure to select and rigorously implement a coherent conceptu-
alization of partnerships. Specifically, sometimes Subchapter K treats partner-
ships as mere aggregates of their owners; other times, Subchapter K treats
partnerships as entities separate from their owners; Subchapter K sometimes
takes a hybrid approach, treating partnerships partly as aggregates and partly as
separate entities; and yet at other times, aggregate versus entity treatment is
elective for partnerships and their owners.1
This schizophrenia reflects a tendency we noted earlier: the pursuit of the-
oretical precision even at the price of great complication. Sometimes, the
desired precision is ostensibly to benefit the fisc - to foreclose avenues of
potential abuse. Other times, it is for the ostensible benefit of taxpayers. In
both dimensions, though, a rough justice alternative often would yield tolerable
outcomes with far less complexity. Consider the following two examples
involving purchase and sale of partnership interests.
(i) When a taxpayer sells a partnership interest, how should the resultant
gain or loss be treated? Entity theory would treat the sale as unitary: the tax-
payer sold one asset, the partnership interest. This would make the gain or loss
capital in nature."O In contrast, aggregate theory would treat the sale as multi-
ple in nature: sale of the partnership interest is sale of an undivided interest in
each of the partnership's assets. Thus, the gain or loss on sale may be part
capital and part ordinary depending on whether the partnership's assets are cap-
ital or ordinary in character.
Subchapter K takes a hybrid approach. The general rule is entity in
nature, capital gain or loss." 1 However, a subsequent section partly overrides
that general rule. It treats the gain or loss as ordinary to the extent it comes
from certain ordinary income assets of the partnership.' 2 In theory, this pro-
tects the Government, preventing the abuse or imprecision of allowing capital
gain treatment even on the portion of gain which ultimately is attributable to
ordinary assets. 1 3
But, of course, the part entity/part aggregate approach taken by Subchapter
K comes at a cost: considerably increased complexity as compared to a pure
entity approach.' 14 Is the benefit worth the cost? I doubt it. When C corpora-
108 For another example, see Stephen Utz, Allocation and Reallocation in Accordance with
the Partners' Interests in the Partnership, 56 TAX LAW. 357 (2003) (discussing outcome
complexity as to Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) & (4)).
'09 See, e.g., WILLIAM S. McKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1-6 to 1-9 (3d ed. 1997).
11o The partnership interest would be a capital asset under I.R.C. § 1221 (West 2004), and
the sale of a capital asset produces capital gain or loss under I.R.C. § 1222.
111 I.R.C. § 741.
112 I.R.C. § 751(a) (dealing with unrealized receivables and inventory items of the
partnership).
113 Of course, the gate swings both ways. Changing capital losses into ordinary losses
depresses federal revenues, just as changing capital gains into ordinary gains enhances
revenues.
114 I.R.C. § 751, the so called "collapsible partnership" rules, is best by "fearsome complex-
ities," McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 109, at 16-7, and, in the opinion of some,
is "the most complex part of Subchapter K," AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER K: PROPOSALS ON THE TAXATION OF PARTNERS 8 (1984). In
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tion stock is sold, the Code uses an unalloyed entity (capital) approach. The
same is true when S corporation stock is sold.' 15 Far more capital and tax
revenue is at stake as to sales of C and S corporation stock than as to sales of
partnership interests. If the nation can bear without undue pain the "impreci-
sion" of an entity approach in the larger context, it should be able to do so in
the smaller context. Contrary to Subchapter K, I would make the choice for
rough justice simplicity over complex theoretical precision, even if that entails
surrendering some revenue in partnership-interest sale cases.
(ii) An ostensibly pro-taxpayer complication involves outside basis/inside
basis adjustments.' 16 Assume a new partner ("Nate") buys a partnership inter-
est from a prior partner. Nate's basis in that partnership interest (so called
"outside basis") will be the sum of what he paid for the interest plus the share
of partnership liabilities allocable to that interest.' 1 7 In general, though, under
an entity-based section, Nate's outside basis will have no effect on the partner-
ship's basis in the property it owns (so called "inside basis").' 8 When the
partnership sells that property, any gain will be allocated to all the partners,
including Nate, in proportion to their interests (unless a special allocation is in
effect). 9 When partnership property is substantially appreciated and Nate's
purchase price for the interest reflects that appreciation, this arrangement can
result in Nate being overtaxed. That is, he could pay tax on the appreciation
(when realized on sale of the partnership assets) despite having already paid for
the appreciation (when he bought the partnership interest).
To prevent this apparent unfairness, Congress enacted a relief regime. If a
partnership has filed an election with the IRS,' 2 ° the partnership's inside basis
is adjusted to reflect the outside basis of the new partner, but only as to the new
partner (Nate). 2 ' With Nate's outside basis and the partnership's inside basis
harmonized, the prospect of overtaxation is mitigated.
Thus, considerable precision is achieved - at least in theory. But is it
worth it? There are four reasons why it is not. First, the problem addressed by
the relief regime is only temporary. Gain allocated to Nate on account of the
sale of partnership property increases his outside basis.' 2 2 That higher basis
will benefit Nate later. For example, it may allow him to deduct additional
addition to § 751(a), § 751 includes § 751(b) - also exceedingly complex. See Monte A.
Jackel & Avery I. Stok, Blissful Ignorance: Section 751(b) Uncharted Territory, 98 TAX
NoTEs 1557, 1558 (2003).
115 However, some complexity can follow the sale of S corporation stock because of rules
allocating income and expense among shareholders for the year in which an ownership
change occurs. See I.R.C. § 1377(a).
116 Roughly speaking, basis measures a taxpayer's investment in an asset. Basis is impor-
tant for many purposes. For example, it is central to calculating a taxpayer's gain or loss on
the sale or exchange of property. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b).
117 I.R.C. §§ 742, 752 & 1012.
118 I.R.C. § 743(a).
19 I.R.C. §§ 701, 702(a) & 704(b).
120 I.R.C. § 754.
121 I.R.C. § 743.
122 I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A).
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pass-through losses from the partnership,' 2 3 or it may increase his deductible
loss or decrease his taxable gain when Nate later sells his partnership inter-
est. 124 If Nate overpays initially, he recovers it later.
Second, Nate could protect himself against even the temporary harm. The
outside basis/inside basis disequilibrium is no secret. Experienced buyers or
their experienced tax advisors should be aware of it (though, of course, many
are not). Being aware of it, they can readily avert the problem. A built-in tax
disadvantage would make the partnership interest less valuable. An astute Nate
thus would pay less to buy that interest, minimizing or eliminating the per-
ceived problem.
Third, even were there a problem that requires correction, the relief mech-
anism Congress fashioned is less effective in practice than it is in theory. Some
partners, partnerships, and their advisors do not know about the relief regime.
Even when they do, they sometimes choose not to make the election required to
trigger the relief. That choice sometimes reflects the fact that the tax interests
of different partners are adverse.' 25 That choice, at other times, reflects sheer
frustration with an overly complicated mechanism. Many partnerships decide
to omit the election and its consequent relief regime simply because these
mechanisms are seen as more trouble than they're worth. The bother of going
through the steps is disproportionate to the benefit of doing so.
Fourth, the mechanism Congress crafted adds considerably to the com-
plexity of Subchapter K. 12 6 When a regime corrects a problem that would be
only temporary in any event, when taxpayers themselves could avoid the prob-
lem without any special statutory relief, and when the web of correction has
large holes, the correction is not worth having in the Code. Promoting simplic-
ity would be the wiser choice here than chasing after complicated theoretical
perfection.
2. Proposal
Why does the United States need two principal pass-through regimes? We
could survive with only one; indeed, we'd be better off with only one. The
Ship of State would continue to sail smoothly under two, instead of three, prin-
cipal entity taxation regimes: one (Subchapter C) for entities separate from
their owners and one other for pass-through vehicles. 1
27
123 A partner may deduct pass-through losses only to the extent of his or her outside basis.
I.R.C. § 704(d). So, the higher Nate's outside basis, the more pass-through losses he may
deduct.
124 See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
125 When a Section 754 election is in place, Section 743(b) adjustment is compelled, not
optional. If Nate bought his interest at a low price, the "relief' regime could cause inside
basis to be reduced as to him. The relief mechanism can hurt new partners, just as it can
help them.
126 One has but to read - or attempt to read - the applicable regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1.743-
1 (2002), to form a firm conviction of the complexity of the relief regime.
127 I am not proposing abolition of highly specialized pass-through regimes like RICs and
REITs (see supra note 87), hence the reference to "principal" pass-though regimes. This is
not to deny, however, that reform opportunities exist as to such specialized regimes also.
For one proposal, see Clarissa C. Potter, A Wrench or a Sledgehammer? Fixing FASITs, 56
SMU L. REv. 501 (2003).
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If this proposal is adopted, which of the two major pass-through regimes
should survive? Many commentators think that partnerships - or limited liabil-
ity companies taxed as partnerships 128 - are the better entity-form choice for
taxpayers. 129 Yet, despite predictions of their demise,130 S corporations con-
tinue to be formed. Indeed, there are more S corporations than there are part-
nerships and LLCs. '31
The reader will have deduced (correctly) that I prefer Subchapter S to
Subchapter K because the former is easier for taxpayers to apply and for IRS to
enforce. Thus, were we just to abolish one of the two and leave the other
unchanged, I would urge abolition of Subchapter K. But, for me, which regime
survives is secondary to making sure that only one survives. Let it be Sub-
chapter K, Subchapter S, or some amalgam that incorporates the best features
of both. 13 2 But let there be only one.
In a simplified environment, taxpayers will encounter reduced costs and
greater certainty. In addition, freed to focus its attention and resources more
narrowly, the IRS will improve its application of the Code. IRS audit coverage
of pass-through entities is (put generously) spotty, even lower than its general
audit coverage. 133 One of the reasons for this is that, even within the IRS, there
are not enough people who understand the provisions governing taxation of
128 An LLC with more than one owner may elect to be treated as either a corporation or a
partnership for federal income tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2002). If it files
no election, it will be treated as a partnership. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).
129 E.g., COVEN, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 100, at 681; Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Lia-
bility Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger's
Plan, 47 TAX L. REV. 815, 818 (1992) (describing LLC's as "tax Nirvana").
130 E.g., Jeffrey A. Maine, Evaluating Subchapter S in a "Check-the-Box" World, 51 TAX
LAW. 717, 729-30 (1998) (suggesting that S corporations will be "push[ed] ... to the side");
Schwidetzky, supra note 93; Michael L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed "Check-
the-Box" Regulations, 71 TAX NOTES 1679, 1684 (1996) (wondering whether there is "any
continuing need for Subchapter S").
131 Despite the "conventional wisdom" that recommends LLCs, "the contrary reality in tax-
land is that either the [C corporation or S corporation] tends in most market segments to be
the tax entity of choice for small businesses conducted in an entity form rather than as a sole
proprietorship." John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Uni-
verse: "Hey the Stars Might Lie but the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 887
(2000).
Based on returns filed for the year 2000, there were approximately 872,000 general
partnerships, 349,000 limited partnerships, and 719,000 LLCs as against 2,860,000 S corpo-
rations and 2,184,000 C corporations. Sheldon I. Banoff & Richard M. Lipton (eds.), Revi-
siting What's More Popular: Partnerships, LLC's, or S Corporations, J. TAX'N, Sept. 2003,
at 189, 190 (citing Joint Comm. on Taxation report, JCX-62-03, June 18, 2003).
The figures are not directly comparable, however. For instance, half or more of all S
corporations have a single owner. Susan M. Whitman, S Corporation Returns. 1994, 16 IRS
STAT. INCOME BULL. 38, 39-40 (1997). Partnerships, of course, must have more than one
owner.
132 For suggested improvements to the partnership tax rules, see William B. Brannan, The
Subchapter K Reform Act of 1997, 75 TAX NOTES 121 (1997); Philip F. Postlewaite & John
S. Pennell, JCT's Partnership Tax Proposals - "Houston, We Have a Problem," 76 TAX
NOTES 527 (1997); Joint Comm. on Taxation, Review of Selected Entity Classification and
Partnership Tax Issues (JCS-6-97) (1997); Ernest & Young LLP, Analysis of the Adminis-
tration's Partnership Proposals, 84 TAX NOTES 103 (1999).
133 In FY 2002, the supposed audit rate for all returns was 0.48%, while the audit rates for
partnership and S corporation returns were 0.26% and 0.39%, respectively. Internal Reve-
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pass-through entities (particularly partnerships) and their owners.' 34 Improving
the IRS's application of the pass-through entity rules would benefit both the
federal fisc (when the IRS knows enough to make proper adjustments to return
inaccuracies) and taxpayers (when the IRS knows enough to omit improper
adjustments it might otherwise have proposed or to concede, short of trial,
improper adjustments it had proposed).
B. Eliminate the TEFRA Partnership Audit Rules
1. Complexity
We have just reviewed complexity in the substantive rules governing
entity taxation. It is matched by complexity in the procedural rules as to entity
taxation. While there are three major substantive regimes (Subchapters C, K,
and S), there are five procedural regimes:
(1) As we have seen, C corporations are considered taxpayers separate
from their owners for substantive purposes. This conceptualization is carried
over into the procedural realm. The corporation files income tax returns,
135
and the IRS audits those returns. If the IRS believes a return understates tax
liability, it issues a notice of deficiency to the corporation. The corporation
brings a court case disputing the deficiency notice. If the IRS prevails, it col-
lects the additional liability from the corporation. If the corporation's assets are
insufficient, the IRS might be able to seek secondary collection from the corpo-
ration's shareholders, 136 but only under a narrow set of circumstances, usually
involving the transfer of corporate assets to the shareholders. 37
The procedural rules as to partnerships and their owners are not so easily
stated, in part because of the vexing "entity versus aggregate" question.
Income taxation of partnerships and partners may be any of pure aggregate
(audit and litigation at partner level), mixed aggregate and entity (audit and
litigation involving both the partners and the partnership), or pure entity (audit
and litigation at the partnership level).
(2) Originally, pure aggregate theory prevailed. Although partnerships file
annual "returns," 138 they are really only information returns since partnerships
(as pass-through entities) have no income tax liability. The main purpose of the
nue Service, 2002 DATA BOOK 17, table 10, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
02databk.pdf (last visited June 12, 2004).
134 The explanation for low audit coverage certainly is not that pass-through entity taxation
is already an area of high taxpayer compliance. "Most scholars of partnership taxation have
a nagging suspicion that much, perhaps most, of Subchapter K is honored principally in the
breach." Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L. REV.
365, 365-66 (2003); see also George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business
Firms, 4 FLA. TAx REV. 141 (1999).
135 IRS Form 1120 (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f I 120.pdf.
136 This is principally done through the device of transferee liability. See I.R.C. § 6901
(1982).
137 Absent such transfer or other special circumstance, a shareholder is not considered a
fiduciary liable for the corporation's unpaid tax liabilities. E.g., Grieb v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.
156, 163 (1961).
138 IRS Form 1065 (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1065.pdf.
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partnership return is to report to the IRS how much of each item of income,
deduction, and credit is allocable to each partner. 139
Under the original regime, any audit was of the return(s) filed by the part-
ner(s).140 The IRS agent performing the audit would consult the partnership's
return and the relevant K-i, but only as sources bearing on the partner's liabil-
ity. If the agent concluded that partnership items were incorrectly reported on
the partner's return, 4 ' the IRS issued a statutory notice of deficiency to the
partner, who then could challenge it in court. If the IRS prevailed, the IRS
collected the deficiency from the partner's assets. One of those assets may be
the partnership interest. However, the accepted wisdom is that the federal tax
lien operates only as a charging order against the partnership interest. That is,
the IRS would be entitled, standing in the partner's shoes for this purpose, to
levy on any distributions from the partnership to the partner but would not be
able to compel the partnership to make such a distribution or to levy on the
assets of the partnership itself.'4 2
(3) In 1982, Congress enacted a new partnership audit and litigation
regime in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act ("TEFRA"). 4 3 In the
TEFRA procedures, Congress flirted with entity-level audit and litigation of
partnership issues but could not bring itself to fully embrace them."'4 The first
of the relevant sections provides that, with exceptions to follow, "the tax treat-
ment of any partnership item . . . shall be determined at the partnership
level."' 4 5 The second section generally requires partners to take positions on
their own returns that are consistent with positions taken on the partnership's
return. 1
46
Audit occurs at the partnership level. The IRS's determinations are set
forth in an FPAA (final partnership administrative adjustment), the functional
equivalent of the statutory notice of deficiency.' 4 7 The partnership may chal-
lenge the FPAA in the Tax Court, district court, or the Court of Federal
"I The vehicles for this are the Schedules K-I attached to the Form 1065. For discussion of
the IRS's fitfull attempts to match K-I's against partners' returns, see Johnson, supra note 9,
at 1018.
140 See generally CONFERENCE REPORT To ACCOMPANY H.R. 4961, TAX EQUITY AND Fis-
CAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, H.R. Rep. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 599 (1982).
141 This may happen either because: (1) the amounts allocated to the partner on the Sched-
ule K- I are correct, but the partner claims different amounts on his return; or (2) the amounts
on the K-i are incorrect.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 286 (2002).
143 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (partnership audit and litigation provisions codi-
fied at I.R.C. §§ 6221-34). TEFRA, by the way, is my all-time favorite statutory title. It is a
source of great comfort to know that, since 1982, our taxes have been equitable and our
government has been fiscally responsible.
'" For description of the TEFRA partnership procedures, see Claudine Ausness, Partner-
ship Level Proceedings: Policies, Procedures and Planning, 72 KY. L.J. 89 (1983/1984);
Carmen D. Tucker Bakarich, Auditing the Partnership: The Rules and the Complications, 31
WASHBURN L.J. 18 (1991); L. Glenn Worley, The Tax Treatment of Partnership Items Act of
1982: Pragmatic Procedures for Determining Partners' Shares of Partnership Income, 14
MEMPHIS ST. U. REV. 1 (1983).
14 I.R.C. § 6221 (West 2004).
146 I.R.C. § 6222(a). However, the partner may take an inconsistent position if she files a
statement with the IRS identifying the inconsistency. I.R.C. § 6222(b)(1).
141 I.R.C. § 6223(a)(2).
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Claims.' 48 The partnership is represented in these and other matters by a point
person, the TMP (tax matters partner).' 49
Yet those entity-based approaches are modified by aggregate-based notice
and participation rules. The IRS must mail to partners copies of the notice
beginning the audit and of the FPAA.' 5° Moreover, if the TMP files a petition
contesting the FPAA each partner with an interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding' 5 ' is treated as a party to the action and is allowed to participate in
it.152 If the TMP fails to timely file a petition, certain individual partners or a
group of partners are allowed additional time to file a petition. 153 The TMP,
certain individual partners, and a group of partners may appeal an adverse deci-
sion by the trial court.' 54
However, as a result of a number of exceptions and special rules, the
TEFRA regime does not apply to all partners and partnerships. For example,
entities that elect out of Subchapter K155 are outside the TEFRA procedures
since they are not required to file partnership returns.
156
More importantly, the TEFRA procedures do not apply to so called small
partnerships, i.e., partnerships with ten or fewer partners, each of whom is a
natural person (and may not be a nonresident alien) or a natural person's estate
and each of whom has a share of each partnership item which is the same as her
share of every other item. 157 However, a partnership within this definition may
elect into the TEFRA regime.
158
The TEFRA rules may not apply to some particulars even if they apply to
the partnership generally. Generically, not all items on the partner's return will
be partnership items subject to the TEFRA procedures. 159 Other items may be
partnership items generically, but be removed from that category because of
special, defined circumstances.
160
When, for any reasons, the TEFRA rules do not apply, we are kicked back
to the original, pre-TEFRA rules. That is, any audit and litigation will proceed
at the partner-level, under an aggregate theory of partnership procedure.
(4) Neither a pure aggregate approach nor even a mixed aggregate-entity
approach is feasible when the partnership has hundreds or even thousands of
partners. Thus, in 1987, Congress enacted a special, pure entity approach.161 It
applies to "publicly traded partnerships": partnership interests which "are
traded on an established securities market" or "are readily tradable on a secon-
148 I.R.C. § 6226(a).
149 See I.R.C. §§ 6226(c), 6231(a)(7).
"' I.R.C. § 6223(a).
151 See I.R.C. § 6226(d).
152 I.R.C. § 6226(c).
153 I.R.C. § 6226(b).
154 I.R.C. § 6226(g).
'55 See I.R.C. § 761.
156 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6031(b)-iT (2003).
"' I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1)(B).
158 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1)(B)(ii).
159 See I.R.C. § 6231(a)(3)-(5) (distinguishing partnership, nonpartnership, and affected
items).
160 See I.R.C. § 6231(b)-(c).
161 Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330-403 (1987).
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dary market (or the substantial equivalent thereof)."' 6 2 Such partnerships are
"treated as corporations";163 that is, they are handled procedurally at the part-
nership level exclusively.
164
(5) Unlike partnerships which are wholly pass-through vehicles, S corpo-
rations 165 do pay several types of income tax at the entity level. 166 As to pass-
through items, though, an aggregate approach applies, mirroring the owner-
level procedures originally applied (and still applied when the TEFRA and pub-
licly traded partnership regimes are inapposite) to partnerships.
It has not always been thus. In the same year as TEFRA, a different stat-
ute enacted somewhat parallel procedures for S corporations.' 67 Those parallel
S corporation procedures were repealed, however, for tax years beginning in or
after 1997.168
In the multi-tiered system just described, there is little doubt at which level
the greatest complexity resides. The other levels creak from time to time, but
the TEFRA regime groans continually. The notice and participation rules cre-
ate a variant on forms complexity,' 6 9 with the IRS, the courts, the TMP, the
other partners, and their advisers all bearing some of the inconvenience and
expense. 70
But that irritant is far eclipsed by the outcome complexity engendered by
TEFRA. The points of controversy as to the TEFRA rules have been myriad.
They divide into two classes: (1) uncertainties internal to specific TEFRA rules
and (2) uncertainties as to the interaction of the TEFRA procedures and other
procedures.
As to particular sections, numerous TEFRA rules have provoked contro-
versy. '7 Courts often disagreed with each other on the issues. Sometimes,
162 I.R.C. § 7704(b).
163 I.R.C. § 7704(a).
164 For additional discussion of this regime, see COVEN, PERONI, & PUGH, supra note 100,
at 811-13.
165 S corporations are organized under the usual state corporation laws, but they must meet
defined eligibility criteria and file an election to be taxed under Subchapter S. See I.R.C.
§§ 1361(a)(1), (b), 1362(a)-(c).
166 See I.R.C. §§ 1363(d), 1374, 1375.
167 Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 1669, 1691-92
(1982) (formerly codified at repealed I.R.C. §§ 6221-45).
168 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, § 1307(c)(1), 110 Stat.
1755, 1781 (1996).
169 Despite this, some believe that the notice and participation opportunities do not go far
enough. For a proposal to expand them, see Don R. Spellman, Taxation Without Notice:
Due Process and Other Notice Shortcomings with the Partnership Audit Rules, 52 TAX LAW.
133 (1998).
170 The TEFRA regime has "generated thousands of billable and non-billable hours of work
for tax practitioners who had to learn the intricacies of partnership items, affected items, and
different statute of limitations rules. Even after all this study, however, the exact meaning of
these new rules was far from clear." Burgess JW. Raby & William L. Raby, TEFRA Part-
nership Rules: The Solution Becomes the Problem, 88 TAX NoTEs 795 (2000).
171 For a description of some of the many areas of uncertainty and conflict, see id.; Tim A.
Tarter & Terrance D. Woolston, TEFRA Audit Provisions: Don't Wait for an Audit To
Understand Them, 84 TAX NOTES 587 (1999); F. Brook Voght, Frederick H. Robinson &
Michael E. Baillif, New Rules for TEFRA Partnerships Provide More Flexibility in Resolv-
ing Disputes with IRS, J. TAX'N 279 (1998).
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decisions of the same court have been in conflict. This confusion is all the
more regrettable because promoting consistency and uniformity was a central
goal of Congress in enacting the TEFRA procedures.'
17
Similar outcome complexity existed under the quasi-TEFRA audit and liti-
gation rules that governed S corporations between 1983 and 1996. A striking
example was the "small S corporation" exception. The 1983 statutes enacting
these rules 173 were sparse, and the regulation governing the exception was not
effective until 1987.17' The case law was in disarray:
" At first, the Tax Court held that a small S corporation exception existed but
applied only to single-shareholder corporations. 1
75
" Some other courts disagreed with the Tax Court, some holding that the exception
was broader, 176 others holding that no small S corporation exception existed at
all. 1
77
" The Tax Court later reversed itself, holding that the small S corporation exception
did not exist until the effectiveness of the Regulation.
178
As to TEFRA/non-TEFRA coordination, partners' returns contain items
from partnership operations as well as items from other activities. Examina-
tions of the different items will proceed on two different tracks: TEFRA and
non-TEFRA. This has led to problems. Indeed,
it is virtually impossible to have two entirely discrete tax procedural regimes when
there are so many ways that partnership items can operate on a taxpayer's affected
items and indirectly influence even non-partnership items. The potential for overlap-
ping effects and hidden boomerangs is mind-numbing. 1
79
Of course, most new legal regimes entail transitional uncertainties, but
TEFRA's complexity has proved to be far from merely transitory. Now, over
two decades since enactment of the TEFRA unified partnership procedures,
many significant issues remain unsettled. The outcome complexity of the
TEFRA procedures remains daunting.
1 8 0
172 E.g., Kaplan v. United States, 133 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing legislative
report).
173 See supra note 167.
174 Former Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6241-1T(c)(2)(i) (exempting from the quasi-TEFRA
rules S corporations with 5 or fewer shareholders; effective for tax years for which the return
was due on or after January 30, 1987).
17 E.g., 111 West 16th St. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 1243 (1988); Blanco v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.
1169 (1987).
176 E.g., Arenjay v. Comm'r, 920 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1991) (exception exists for S corpora-
tions with ten or fewer shareholders); see also Fehlhaber v. Comm'r, 954 F.2d 653 (1 1th Cir.
1992) (stating no clear theory).
177 E.g., Miller v. Comm'r, 710 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
178 E. States Cas. Agency, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 773 (1991).
179 Voght, Robinson & Bailif, supra note 171, at 279-80.
'80 For an example, see Raby & Raby, supra note 170, at 795 ("it becomes apparent that the
statute of limitations rules, in particular, are still not settled even after 18 years") (comparing
GAF Corp. v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 519 (2000), and Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties,
Ltd. v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 533 (2000), appeal dismissed & remanded, 249 F.3d 175 (3d Cir.
2001).
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2. Proposal
The TEFRA partnership procedures are the worst portion of the entity
audit and litigation process. The complexity they spawn is not justified by any
compelling need. The TEFRA procedures should be abolished.
As usual, some history is useful. The TEFRA partnership rules were a
response to the proliferation of individual tax shelters in the 1960s through
1980s. Unlike the current wave of shelters involving "tax products" more or
less tailored to publicly traded corporations and certain high-income individu-
ais, 1 8 1 the earlier wave of tax shelters involved mass marketing: many
thousands of partnerships, each with dozens, often hundreds of "investors."
This created an unprecedented paperwork burden on the IRS. Once it had iden-
tified a shelter offering inflated tax benefits, the IRS would have to identify the
taxpayers participating in it, then pull, coordinate, and adjust their returns. The
difficulties were compounded by the fact that partners in the same partnership
often were located in many different IRS districts. Especially in the early
years, the IRS was unable to handle all the paper. Many thousands of returns
containing shelter items went unexamined because the IRS could not process
them within the statute-of-limitations period.182
For this reason, the IRS sought entity-level partnership audit procedures at
least as early at 1978.183 When the TEFRA procedures were enacted four years
later, the administrative burdens of partner-level auditing was the key rationale
offered.1 84 However, this exigency probably was insufficient warrant for the
TEFRA procedures in 1982, and it certainly is insufficient warrant for them
now. Consider the following four points:
(1) In the lag between 1978 and 1982, or at least fairly shortly after 1982,
the IRS and the courts had developed reasonably effective mechanisms for
coordinating shelter returns. At the audit level, the IRS assigned numbers to
shelters. It coordinated returns of individual partners in those shelters through
the assigned numbers and related standardized notices, often controlled by des-
ignated point personnel. 185 At the litigation level, IRS Counsel developed
coordinated national projects, standardized settlement positions, test cases cou-
pled with subsequent "show cause" orders, and similar approaches. In short,
Congress delayed during the time that unified procedures might have been
helpful, then legislated at a time when alternative processes had greatly under-
cut the need for such procedures.
(2) Even if some need existed for effective unified procedures in 1982,
what Congress enacted was far from effective. As we have noted,' s6 the
181 See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
182 The statute of limitations period is normally three years. See I.R.C. § 6501(a).
183 See, e.g., The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 280-90 (1978).
184 See, e.g, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLA-
NATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT
OF 1982 268 (Comm. Print 1982).
185 These procedures worked well despite occasional glitches. See Scar v. Comm'r, 814
F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987) (invalidating a notice of deficiency which, because of an inputting
error as to the tax shelter's number, contained explanatory paragraphs relating to the wrong
shelter).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 161-164.
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TEFRA procedures are not pure entity in nature, but instead mix entity and
aggregate features in ways that are cumbersome and often unclear. These rules
are an object lesson in "Be careful what you wish for. You may get it."
(3) If the 1982 legislation did do anything positive, its contribution was
rendered unnecessary by 1986 legislation.' 87 In that year, Congress enacted the
passive activity loss rules. These rules prevent a taxpayer from using shelter
deductions and credits to offset income from services and investment., 88 Thus,
in large measure, the IRS need not examine and disallow shelter items. It
doesn't matter whether those items are $1,000 or $1,000,000 as long as they are
bottled up and unusable against the kinds of income potential "investors" are
trying to shelter. 189 The passive activity loss rules effectively ended the first,
mass-marketed wave of tax shelters. That being so, the original justification for
the TEFRA rules has been outmoded for nearly 20 years.
(4) By the numbers, there is no important place in the partnership contin-
uum where the TEFRA rules matter. The great bulk of partnerships have 10 or
fewer partners.' 90 There should not be severe difficulties in auditing such
small partnerships at the owner level. In any event, partnerships of this size are
permitted to opt out of the TEFRA regime, returning to owner-level treat-
ment.' 9 ' Additionally, the concern prompting enactment of the TEFRA regime
centered on partnerships with many partners. Since 1987, the largest publicly
traded partnerships have been subject to a different, pure entity regime.' 9 2 Fur-
thermore, the intermediate zone between "under 10 partners" and publicly
traded partnerships is of limited significance. The TEFRA rules cannot be
upheld by such a slender reed.
Compare the weak current justification for the TEFRA rules to the great
complexity they impose. It is hard to resist the conclusion that "the 1982
changes may have become a greater procedural problem than what remains of
the procedural problems they were adopted to solve."' 93
187 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
188 I.R.C. § 469(a)(1), (d), (h)(2).
189 For a discussion of the passive activity loss rules, see Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMa-
hon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, A Whirlwind Tour of the Internal Revenue Code's At-Risk
and Passive Activity Loss Rules, 36 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 673 (2002); Mona L.
Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody Listening?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 615
(1998); Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-
Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499 (1989); Robert J.
Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1988).
190 Based on 1999 returns, general partnerships (of which there were about 889,000) had an
average of four partners, limited partnerships (354,000) an average of twenty-five partners,
limited liability partnerships (42,000) an average of five partners, and limited liability com-
panies (589,000) an average of four members. JACK H. TAYLOR, REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
PAss-THOUGH ORGANIZATIONS NOT TAXED AS CORPORATIONS (Cong. Res. Serv. Print
2002).
191 See supra text accompanying notes 157-158.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 161-164.
'9' Raby & Raby, supra note 170, at 795.
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C. Eliminate the Accumulated Earnings Tax
1. Complexity
The fact that C corporations are treated as taxpayers separate from their
shareholders leads to the possibility of double taxation. Profits can be taxed
once (to the corporation) when earned, then a second time (to the corporation's
shareholders) when they are distributed as dividends.' 94
To blunt the second level of tax, corporations may be tempted to omit or
delay paying dividends.195 This would be feasible when the shareholders do
not have current need for the money, or if they prefer to receive the benefit of
the profits through selling their stock rather than through receiving divi-
dends,196 or if they prefer to pass the benefit of the profits on to those who
ultimately will inherit their stock.' 9 7
For the very reason that the taxpayer may deem forgone or delayed distri-
bution desirable, the government deems it undesirable. The government has
attempted to influence corporate dividend policies in part via the accumulated
earnings tax ("AET").'9 8 Under it, a corporation which fails to distribute its
earnings and profits will be liable for a penalty tax. 199 So, the taxpayer's
choice is either to distribute profits (incurring shareholder-level tax in addition
to the regular corporate income tax) or to retain the earnings (incurring the
corporate-level penalty tax in addition to the regular corporate income tax). 2"
This design was given particular significance by the relationship between
individual and corporate income tax rates. For much of our income tax history,
the top rate on individuals considerably exceeded the top rate on corpora-
tions.2 ° ' This created an incentive for the wealthy to generate income through
owned or controlled corporations rather than in their individual capacities. The
AET and related provisions" were intended to discourage this means of tax
minimization.2 "3
'9' See I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(7) & 301 (West 2004).
19 Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R. 2571, H.R. 3397, and H.R. 4448 Before Subcomm. On
Select Revenue Measures of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong. 22 (1986)
(statement of J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy).
196 The stock price should rise to the extent the corporation has retained, rather than distrib-
uted, its earnings. For most of our tax history, capital gains on sale of stock held for a
sufficient period have been taxed less heavily than dividends.
197 The heir will take an income tax basis in the stock equal to the stock's value as of the
decedent's death. I.R.C. § 1014(a). Undistributed profits should increase that value, and
therefore the heir's basis.
198 I.R.C. § 531-37.
199 I.R.C. § 531.
200 As to this historic purpose, see Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 624-25
(1975).
201 Between 1913 (when the personal income tax began) and 1915, the highest rate for
individuals was 7% while the highest rate for corporations was 1%. From 1916 to 1980, the
difference between those top rates ranged between 13% and 65%. Jeffrey L. Kwall, Sub-
chapter G of the Internal Revenue Code: Crusade Without a Cause?, 5 VA. TAX RaV. 223,
223 (1985).
202 The AET is part of Subchapter G, which also includes sections as to personal holding
companies, I.R.C. §§ 541-47 (West 2004), and foreign personal holding companies, I.R.C.
§§ 551-58.
203 E.g., United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 308 (1969).
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These purposes have been pursued, however, at the cost of complexity.
The AET imposes considerable complexity on taxpayers, the IRS, and courts
alike. Indeed, it engenders all three of the varieties of complexity we have
explored.
(1) Detail Complexity: In general, the AET is applied to corporations
"formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect
to its shareholders . . . by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead
of being divided or distributed.""2 4 There is a rebuttable presumption that the
corporation has been formed or availed of for this purpose if earnings and prof-
its have been accumulated "beyond the reasonable needs of the business."2 5
Special rules address the definition of reasonable needs.206
The tax base for the AET is "accumulated taxable income, ' 20 7 which is
the corporation's taxable income as computed for regular income tax purposes
with specified modifications and minus both a "dividends paid deduction" and
an "accumulated earnings credit. 20 8  Lengthy rules describe the taxable
income modifications, 209 the dividends paid deduction,210 and the accumulated
earnings credit.21  Thus, determining whether a particular corporation in a par-
ticular year is liable for the AET and, if so, in what amount is an intricate
process - the essence of detail complexity.
(2) Forms complexity: A variety of forms complexity exists in the elabo-
rate information exchange mechanism the AET creates through its burden of
proof rules. Before issuing to the corporation a statutory notice of deficiency
asserting an AET adjustment, the IRS may mail the corporation a notification
that such an adjustment is contemplated.212 The corporation may reply by giv-
ing the IRS a statement setting out the grounds on which it relies for its position
that the accumulation was not beyond its reasonable business needs.213 In an
ensuing Tax Court case, the burden of proof with respect to whether the
accumulation was excessive is on the IRS if no pre-statutory notice notification
was given to the taxpayer.214 The burden shifts to the corporation either if such
notification was given and the taxpayer failed to timely file a responsive state-
ment or if a responsive statement was filed but it lacked sufficient detail.21 5
Whether a responsive statement contains sufficient detail often entails
uncertainty. Thus, two steps have become common. First, the taxpayer often
crafts a long responsive statement setting out purported future needs of the
204 I.R.C. § 532(a).
205 I.R.C. § 533(a).
206 I.R.C. § 537.
207 I.R.C. § 531.
208 I.R.C. § 535(a).
209 I.R.C. § 535(b).
210 I.R.C. § 561-65. In addition to dividends actually paid, see I.R.C. § 561(a)(1), the
deduction includes a special creature known as consent dividends, necessitating a further set
of rules, see I.R.C. § 565.
211 I.R.C. § 535(c).
212 I.R.C. § 534(b).
213 I.R.C. § 534(c).
214 I.R.C. § 534(a).
215 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.534-2(b), (d) (2002). Congress enacted a general burden of proof
rule for civil tax cases in 1998, but the Section 534 rules control over the general rule. See
I.R.C. § 7491(a)(3).
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business in minute detail. Second, after close of pleadings but before trial, the
corporation and the IRS frequently submit cross-motions to the Tax Court argu-
ing why the taxpayer's statement was or was not sufficiently detailed and ask-
ing the court to declare which party will bear the burden of proof at trial. The
court then often issues an opinion resolving those motions.2 16 Of course, the
case itself remains to be tried; the opinion only resolves who will bear the
burden of proof in the upcoming trial.
The elaborate procedures just described have some justification assuming
we are to have an AET at all. AET cases usually turn on the intensely factual
inquiry of what needs could reasonably be anticipated for the particular busi-
ness in the years ahead. The procedures above serve as discovery devices,
encouraging the parties to develop a full factual record on which the court can
decide the case.
Nonetheless, the paperwork complexity is great. Given the IRS's pre-stat-
utory notice notification, the corporation's responsive statement, the parties'
cross-motions, and the Tax Court opinion as to location of the burden of proof,
the cumulative costs in time, effort, and money often are substantial.2 17
(3) Outcome complexity: Even when the record is fully developed, the
ultimate resolution of AET cases often is hard to predict. How much is
enough? Are the needs asserted by the taxpayer real or pretextual? When does
prudence slide into overcaution? Anyone who has taken a Torts course knows
the "eye of the beholder" quality of "reasonable." Moreover, AET cases assess
reasonableness through the always dark glass of the future.
In short, only incurably optimistic lawyers feel confident about victory in
AET trials, and victory at trial affords only limited security since appellate
reversals are common in AET cases.218 Outcome complexity - like detail com-
plexity and a variant of forms complexity - abounds in AET cases.
2. Proposal
The AET should be abolished. This is an easy sell, of course, to the sizea-
ble segment of tax theorists who believe in "integration"; that is, elimination of
two levels of tax on corporate earnings.2t 9 Yet integration remains controver-
sial,220 and the United States has not yet committed to it. The Joint Committee
on Taxation, in its 2001 simplification study, expressly refrained from making
216 E.g., Gustafson's Dairy, Inc. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1639 (1995); Iowa School of
Men's Hairstyling v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1114 (1992).
217 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 131, at 917-18 (noting transaction costs imposed on taxpayers
by the AET).
218 E.g., Myron's Ballroom v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd &
remanded sub nom. Myron's Enters. v. United States, 548 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1977); Ivan
Allen Co. v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Ga. 1972). rev'd & remanded, 493 F.2d
426 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 617 (1975); Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292
(6th Cir. 1967) (reversing and remanding district court decision), rev'd & remanded, 393
U.S. 297 (1969).
219 See, e.g., Stacy S. Shibao, Applying the Accumulated Earnings Tax to a Publicly Held
Corporation: Technalysis Corporation v. Commissioner, 47 TAX LAW. 1061, 1073-74
(1994).
220 For one of the classic studies of the issue, see U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION
OF INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (Jan. 1992).
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a recommendation as to AET elimination because of the unsettled state of the
integration controversy.221
Abolition of the AET should not depend on integration. The AET should
be ended even if we retain two levels of tax in the corporation context. Some
of the reasons are well known, constituting the traditional case against the AET.
Other reasons flow from the perspectives of administrability-based simplifica-
tion. Below, I consider both types of reasons in four points.
(1) The historical justification for the AET has eroded sharply. In the last
twenty-five years, the differential between the top individual income tax rate
and the top corporate rate has largely evaporated.222 In 2006, when legislation
becomes fully phased in, the top individual rate and the top corporate rate both
will be 35%.223 Had such parity existed earlier, it is doubtful the AET would
have been adopted.224
(2) There is a dearth of empirical support for the key assumptions that the
existence of the AET significantly affects corporate dividend policy and that
any such effect is beneficial. Dividend policies are strongly influenced by -
often controlled by - economic, personal, and other factors, not by tax rules.225
To the extent the AET does alter corporate behavior, the effect sometimes may
be undesirable. In some cases in which the economically efficient decision
would be to retain funds to fuel future growth, concern that the IRS and the
courts might read "reasonable needs" narrowly could cause businesses instead
to distribute the funds.22 6
Such traditional complaints about the AET are strongly reinforced by
administrability-based simplification considerations. The theoretical justifica-
tion for the AET is that it protects the revenue from erosion. In reality, the
AET does not meaningfully increase tax revenues. Indeed, as argued below, it
probably lowers them.
(3) The IRS sets up relatively few AET adjustments each year, and it has
an uninspiring victory rate in the AET cases that are litigated. As a result, "the
[AET] is not now, nor has it ever been, effective. '227 There are a number of
reasons for this. One is that competent in-house or outside tax advisers under-
stand the game and guide corporations in constructing plausible paperwork,
colorably establishing high future capital needs. Thus, well-advised companies
usually have little fear of the AET.228
221 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 83, vol. II, at 237-38.
222 Indeed, between 1986 and 1993, it was inverted, the top corporate rate being below the
top individual rate. Gene Steuerle, Will Corporate Taxes Survive?, 72 TAX NOTES 1043
(1996).
223 Compare Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§ 101, 117 Stat. 752 (2003) (amending I.R.C. § I as to individual taxpayers) with I.R.C.
§ 1 l(b)(1) (corporate taxpayers).
224 See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 201, at 225 (arguing in part that the AET no longer serves
its historical purposes).
225 See Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evi-
dence from History, 56 TAX L. REv. 463 (2003).
226 See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 201, at 235-37 & n.69, 260-61 (discussing inefficiencies
produced by AET historically); Shibao, supra note 219, at 1073.
227 Lee, supra note 131, at 917 n.174.
228 See, e.g., JEROLD L. WALTMAN, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX 108
(1985).
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Another powerful factor is the reluctance of judges to substitute their own
or the IRS's judgment for the business judgment of the taxpayer. Such defer-
ence is natural since the taxpayer - not judges or administrators - is closest to
the business and best knows its experience and prospects. From an early date,
this was recognized as a significant problem for the IRS in AET litigation.22 9 It
continues to be so more modernly, both as to the AET23 ° and other types of
issues involving IRS second-guessing taxpayers' business judgment.2 3 '
(4) As noted, AET cases are highly fact-intensive. If the IRS fails to
invest enough Examination and Counsel time to fully develop those facts, it
will likely lose the case. If it does invest the required time, it will still likely
lose in a larger sense even if it wins the particular case. That is because of
opportunity costs. IRS resources are distinctly limited. Investing hundreds or
thousands of hours in an AET case means that time can't be invested elsewhere
where the revenue pay-off would have been higher.
One of the AET cases I was involved in when employed by the IRS Chief
Counsel's Office bums in my mind as an example. 32 The taxpayer was a
dairying operation. It asserted future needs for capital involving expansion of
the herd, pollution control, equipment acquisition, capital construction, land
development, debt retirement, and self-insurance. The taxpayer and the IRS
did the discovery dance described above, and the Tax Court ruled (on the cross-
motions) that the taxpayer bore the burden of proof at trial.2 33 When the case
ultimately was tried, however, the taxpayer met that burden. The Tax Court
held that the earnings and profits accumulation was reasonable and the corpora-
tion owed no AET.2 3
4
I can only guess at the time and money the taxpayer had to expend in the
case. For its part, the IRS expended hundreds (if not thousands) of hours on the
case during audit, administrative appeal, and litigation. That large investment
of time yielded zero to the federal coffers. The effective redeployment of those
resources might well have produced substantial revenue. This story has been
229 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 12395 (Revenue Act, 1936) Before Senate Finance Comm.
(pt. 4), 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1936) (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting IRS Chief
Counsel).
230 E.g., Myron's Enters. v. United States, 548 F.2d 331, 334 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A court
should be particularly wary of overturning a finding of a trial court supporting the taxpayer's
determination of its anticipated business needs, since, in the first instance, the 'reasonable-
ness of the needs is necessarily for determination by those concerned with the management
of the particular enterprise. This determination must prevail unless the facts show clearly the
accumulations were for prohibited purposes.'") (quoting Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 364 F.2d 746, 749 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 956 (1967)).
231 See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the
Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 415-16 (1996) (finding that the IRS
loses the majority of litigated cases as to the reasonableness of compensation paid and
deducted by a business).
232 1 rendered legal advice to the revenue agent during the examination. When I left IRS
Counsel to teach, the case was assigned to another attorney who represented the IRS during
the litigation.
233 Gustafson's Dairy, Inc. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1639 (1995).
234 Gustafson's Dairy, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1224 (1997). For discussion of
the case, see John S. Ball & Beverly H. Furtick, Defending the Accumulated Earnings Tax
Case, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1998, at 28.
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repeated in many AET cases. The AET does not effectively protect the fisc.
Because of its opportunity costs, it may well lower the federal tax take.
Perhaps there is some theoretical warrant for the AET. But when one
compares it to the reality of the complexity costs the AET imposes on all par-
ties, the game may not be worth the candle. When one adds the further facts of
the IRS's low AET win-rate and its high opportunity costs, I believe the case
becomes overwhelming. Abolition of the AET is an administrability-based
simplification that would help both taxpayers and the Government.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the all too visible warts of the federal income tax and its many real
disfunctionalities, some form of that tax is likely to continue to be the center-
piece of our system of taxation for the foreseeable future. Thus, at least part of
our attention and energy should be devoted to improving that tax.
In improving the income tax, simplification should command a high prior-
ity, and the notion of administrability should receive considerable emphasis as
a guide on the road to simplification. Administrability washes from our eyes
the pixie dust of what we hope tax rules will achieve and draws our gaze
instead to the realities of what those rules actually do achieve.
There are sound precedents, examples of signal improvements to the
income tax in existing sections based on administrability. Those examples do
not come close to exhausting the field of possibilities. Herein, I have proposed
three other candidates for administrability-based simplification, all involving
the substantive and procedural rules governing income taxation of businesses.
Numerous additional candidates exist in this and other areas.
More important than amendment of any particular Code section, though,
would be an attitudinal change. We must become more willing to choose rough
justice rules that taxpayers and the IRS can apply over theoretically more pre-
cise rules that they can't apply. In crafting tax statutes and regulations, we
must more often be driven by hard realities than by comfortable illusions. We
may not be able to tear out the federal income tax by its roots, but, by sensibly
pruning its branches, we can make it a healthier plant.
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